The problem of "the divine" is a central theme in much of modern philosophy. Like Kant, Hume, and Hegel, Nietzsche accounts for various beliefs within the context of his philosophy, i.e., the philosophy of Will to Power.
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The problem is, thus, not that this need should be extinguished.
Of course, it can be extinguished. The religious instinct (der religiose Instinkt) may grow or wilt. The Last Man, happy with inertia, laughs at the Madman's cry that "God is Dead." However, the Last Man is the greatest danger to the earth precisely because he will not look beyond himself. Thus, Nietzsche is not arguing that the religious instinct be extinguished, but rather that with the death of the old God, the religious instinct be rekindled by a new experience of divinity.
Nietzsche has an experience of "the divine," 2 and it is the theoretical explication of this experience which motivates and frames his evaluation of devotedness. Within this evaluation he asks whether the various types of beliefs about God hinder or help man. What do mankind's valuations of godliness mean?
As is well known, Nietzsche delivers a critique of the highest values of mankind. Man, the locus of opposites within Will to Power, guides his conflicting will(s) to power by values. Values are man's means for creating order out of chaos and giving himself meaning. Man is both the evaluator and the creator of values. Values set his goals. The highest values in history are to date, moral, and the greater part of morality is robed in sacred attire. This is so even though "in itself, religion has nothing to do with morality." This was a leap. Man went to war with himself. Consciously and unconsciously, he became a collection of confliciting will(s) to power. He sought meaning in a meaningless world.
So religion came to fulfill the human need for divine spectators who took great interest in this most interesting animal, man. Put differently, man needed "the divine" both to witness as well as to vindicate the drama of his suffering, his courage, and his struggle for order in the face of a chaotic world.
"The divine" fulfilled man's special need for meaning; it expressed his very uniqueness, his created order from chaos.
The existence on earth of an animal soul turned against itself, taking sides against itself, was something so new, profound, unheard of, enigmatic, contradictory, and pregnant with a future that the aspect of the earth was essentially altered.
Indeed, divine spectators were needed to do justice to the spectacle that thus began and the end of which is not yet in sight-a spectacle too subtle, too marvelous, too paradoxical to be played senselessly unobserved on some ludicrous planet!"* Genealogically, Nietzsche shows that man has given various interpretations to "the divine." First, man interprets "the divine" with fear; later "the divine's" presence is felt with ennobling piety during the intermediate stage of the nobles. The nobles understood their gods to be spontaneous, to ward off "bad conscience" and ressentiment, and to justify and make acceptable human life with all its uncertainty. With the victory of the Slave Revolt of Morality, however, man perceives "the divine" as the sanctification of "mob-ized" morality.
Such morality fears man's instincts for freedom, thus, supressing his conflicting will(s) to power and fostering hereditary weakness. Accordingly, for Nietzsche, this devitalization of the instincts by morality lead to a rigid misinterpretation of "the divine." Sacred values came to express passive nihilism by reducing the conflict and chaos of the world, life, and man to the herd's needs for formation, stabilization, and order. ' The genealogy serves as an uncovering of the original upsurge in man's awareness of "the divine," of his experiences of more-than-human power, and the multiple interpretations of these experiences.
Yet, Nietzsche distinguishes origin from meaning, arche from telos. The genealogy accounts for what man's needs for divinity have meant in history, and not for the possible value of these needs.
The genealogical method, although it sets up the problem of "the divine," is inconclusive.
Nietzsche's analysis of the passive nihilism of some venerations and interpretations of "God" is for the sake of a future radical revaluation of man, history, and "the divine." Revaluation, for Nietzsche, means revitalization of man's will(s) to power.
Sacred values are no longer meaningful, 7 for "God is dead." An onerous image of "God," such as the Christian conception, has entombed man's goal behind the rock of human inertia.
The wonderous-terrible questionability and mystery of existence is diminished; and, the meaning of the symbols through which man interprets "the divine's" effectiveness in satisfying his needs is eviscerated.
II. The Typology of Pious Persons
In contrast to monotheism, Nietzsche demonstrates a plurality of symbols for "God" among differing peoples, times, and individuals throughout history. Entailed in the genealogy is thus an analysis of these peoples and individuals, their spiritual focus and beliefs, and their underlying instincts. This constitutes a typology of pious persons.
Like Xenophanes, Nietzsche, based on his own ontology, poses the problem of the meaning of "the divine" within the framework of a critique of the symbolisms of Theos. The typology of pious persons is the content of this critique.
Since God is not a pure "thing-in-itseif," the symbols for "God" depend on the perspective of the person. God is as He appears to individual men and women; He manifests Himself in idiosyncratic terms. The created meaning is self-referential; man measures his own power correlative to his interpretation of the mightiness of "the divine." given man an inauthentic goal to will. Yet it has been man's only spiritual goal. Thus, the anti-life ascetic ideal has killed God. Now Nietzsche criticizes not only the ascetic ideal as such, the highest ideal of the moral period, but he also attacks by degrees the various persons and beliefs that exemplify this ideal. Given descending instincts, the variety of interpretations are many; however, the goal is one-to hide chaos unconditionally. Thus, Nietzsche's typology of pious persons is arranged according to instincts (descending or ascending) and evaluated in terms of quanta of power. Power is the criteria; power is the issue.
The typology is as follows:
This typology accomplishes two things: first, it describes various spiritual beliefs, and second, it evaluates these phenomena in terms of Nietzsche's goal-the enhancement of Will to Power through revaluation.
The typology is complex: where there are degrees of strength, as with Jesus, this power is appreciated; where there are degrees of weakness, this impotence is depreciated. This typology is not an argument for a return to polytheism or previous paganism.* But it is an attempt to revalue the reverential and spiritual domain of human existence for the future's sake, for Overman's incarnation.
Since the instincts are the ontological conditions for man's life, they constitute the essential subjectmatter of the typographical research which is preparatory for Overman. This study is for the few. It requires a new type of discipline-one distinct from the ascetic ideal.
It requires active nihilism. In evaluating what is greater and more original than man, the most-powerful, "the divine," "holy lies" symbolize the measure of man.
"Holy lies," as ideals, in effect, make man's measure livable.
In discussing "holy lies," what is at stake for Nietzsche is not the will to absolute unconditional truth, the core of the ascetic ideal, which results in atheism.
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